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Abstract:

The Internet reconstructs the order of information dissemination and
power relations during a public crisis and facilitates the redistribution
of discourse power. Therefore, from a micro perspective, it further
complicates a specific crisis; while from a macro perspective, it intensifies
the uncertainty of social risks. In the context of a public crisis, through
the redistribution of discourse power, the Internet promotes competitions
among a diversity of opinions and disintegrates the traditional mechanism
of opinion expression, the mechanism of social trust and the legitimate
mechanism of decision making and power exercising. In the meantime,
the Internet also creates space for social actions. This space, integrating the
virtual space with the real world, enables the public to“upgrade”from
onlookers and expressers to active movers. Dialogue among plural subjects
in the society should be deemed a basic notion and the approach to public
crisis management in the era of the Internet should renew the discourse
order, reconstruct the mechanisms of trust and legitimacy, and cultivate a
sense of identity and community in a pluralist context.
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P

ublic crisis refers to a threatening and pressing incident or state that affects
the mentality, interests and values of the public. Compared with individual
crisis and organizational crisis in a general sense, public crisis is highlighted by the
public, a core feature bringing its influence on the public space. Since the beginning
of the 21st Century, public crises have been a central topic under discussion
worldwide. Countries like the USA, Europe, Japan and China have successively
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introduced public crisis-targeted policies and laws,
and established the basic categories and formulas
for the management of public crises. The frequent
outbreak of sustained public crises in a systematic
and structural way verifies the prediction made
by Beck and Giddens between the 1980s and the
1990s that human beings are stepping into a society
of risks. According to Beck and Giddens (Beck &
Giddens, 2001), modernity is full of contradictions,
paradoxes and self-denials, for which modern society
is faced with increasingly normalized and publicized
risks in nature, society, economy, ideology, trust, as
well as violence in various forms. Fermented and
erupted in the public space of a specific country,
these risks are gradually spreading across the world.
“Living in an era of globalization means we are
faced with an ever-increasing number of different
risks.”[1]
For public crisis management, communications
management is a core issue and it directly concerns
discourse construction, trust repair, legitimacy
reconstruction, public participation, as well as
social identity. If major clues must be clarified, one
is the emergence management concerning power,
systems, resources and technology, the other is
communications management itself. The former is a
“hard management” category, which aims at directly
bringing crisis damage under control; the latter,
though closely related, attaches more importance
to the issues of expression, consensus and identity
during a crisis. This paper explores communication
concepts, mechanisms and approaches adopted in
public risk management, and their relationships with
social identity in the age of the Internet.

1.The Redistribution of Discourse
Power
The rise of the Internet is arguably accompanied
by the emergence of a risk society. Since the

beginning of the 21st Century, the Internet has
been involved in a variety of risks, crises and public
crises. In public crises, the Internet exposes, spreads,
and enlarges various risk elements; it reconstructs
interest relationships and subsequently intensifies
the complexity and variability of a specific crisis.
From a modern macro perspective, the Internet
creates ever-increasing uncertainties concerning
social ideas, knowledge, social relationships, politics,
economy, culture, etc., exacerbating social risks. For
both specific crisis and the entire scenario of a risk
society, the Internet is not just a simple renderer, but
also a profound risk constructor. Through ubiquitous
presentation and construction, the Internet promotes
the gradual normalization and penetration of risks
and crises, and at the same time transfers such an
objective trend into a subjective imagination that
the public are becoming more and more sensitive to
the risk society. The academic views concerning the
Internet’s influence and consequences mainly fall
into the following three categories.
In the first category, the Internet is regarded as the
target of public risk management, an inherent maker
of troubles, risks and uncertainties, as well as a key to
crisis warning, handling and recovery management.
From a perspective of information dissemination,
S. Berrisford holds that the Internet exacerbates the
dilemma of a crisis, resulting in information chaos,
inaccessibility of truth and public disorder.[2] From
a perspective of social relations development, Yu
Guoming argues that the Internet brings about a
revolution of interpersonal relationships and social
relations while advancing the transformation of the
media landscape and public-opinion ecology. It also
commences a full-scale challenge to the government’s
role and action logic.[3]
In the second category, Internet is perceived
as a means of public crisis management, and it is
believed that the openness and interactivity of public
crisis management brings about new possibilities to
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further improvement of communication efficiencies,
optimization of the exercise of power, enhancement
of social mobilization mechanisms, etc. This can be
exemplified by Garnett and Kouzmin's assessment
of the US government’s media communication
mechanism and its efficiency in dealing with the
Hurricane Katrina catastrophe. According to Garnett
and Kouzmin, factors like communication barriers,
failure to effectively utilize information technology
and inflexibility of administrative power have
transformed this natural calamity into a disaster of
communications and public management.[4]
In the third category, “Internet” is understood
as a term reflecting its special time and social
context. To put it another way, the public crises
today are rooted in a “society of new media” during
the “era of the Internet”. Zhang Chengfu and Xie
Yifan argue that the risk to society previously
predicted by scholars such as Beck and Giddens
is now coming into being worldwide. And this is
precisely accompanied with the popularization of
the Internet, which amplifies people's perception of
risks and a risk society and upgrades risk-society
governance into a global social strategy.[5] Hu Baijing
proposes that the Internet is intertwined with issues
concerning modernity, risk society and globlization,
forming a macro context of modern public crises.
Given that, it is now unimaginable to discuss public
crisis management without touching upon the
Internet.[6]
In fact, understood as a target, a tool or a
context, the Internet exerts its impact on public
crisis via the following approach: it changes the
order of information dissemination and discourse
rules and thus transforms the power relations
between crisis-related stakeholders and the power
operation mechanism during crises. The Internet
creates unprecedented resources and opportunities
for the public to express themselves and it shapes
people's understanding, imagination, discussion
118

and construction of public crises. As a diversified
space for the game of power, the Internet impairs
the rules of power and basis of legitimacy previously
dominated by elites from the circles of politics,
business and culture. In this mechanism, the
reconstruction of power relations, triggered by
the reconstruction of discourse, demonstrates a
transition of discourse power. One major reason
the Internet has become a matter concerning
public crisis management, or why public crisis
management has encountered new problems in this
era of the Internet lies in the Internet's redistribution
of discourse power in a crisis.
The notion of discourse power was first
proposed by French philosopher Foucault, who
believed discourse is power. From Foucault’s
perspective, in daily verbal communication and
“in a love-system or economy-based relationship,
one party invariably tries all means to manipulate
the other party's behavior, which indicates that
power is everywhere,” [7] In a way, the entire
human history and civilization are the outcomes
of discourse construction, and are the existents
“retained” or “eliminated” by power by discourse
means. For example, whether a public crisis is a
“natural disaster” or a “man-made disaster” is
ultimately determined by the one who has the final
say. If a crisis is identified as a “natural disaster”,
administrative malpractices like system crumbling,
undisciplined management and officials’ misconduct
will all be “eliminated”. Also, public management
field’s ever-lasting debate over “who is the subject of
public crisis management”, government dominance
or diversified coordination is, in nature, a matter of
discourse power distribution.
Entering the 21st Century, the Internet has
endowed the public with unprecedented discourse
power. Under such circumstances, how to
consolidate, regulate and properly utilize such power
has become an important task. Traditionally, during
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a public crisis, there are confrontations among
three types of discourse power. The first is the topdown elites’ discourse system comprising political
power, material wealth and knowledge resources.
The second is the bottom-up civil discourse system
exercised in the forms of memorial submission,
petition, gathering, parade, demonstration, protest,
etc. The third is the so-called “third party” discourse
system advocated by traditional media like the press,
broadcasters and TV stations. In fact, traditional
media have inevitably become supporters and
transmission pipelines of one party (particularly
the elites' side) during a crisis. The elites tend to
reproduce or legitimize their own interests and
ideology by shaping the framework of the mass
media. And traditional media such as newspapers
and TV are the important channels for them to
exercise their discourse power.[8] There is barely
any chance for the public, especially the vulnerable
groups, to acquire from the media the discourse
power equal to that enjoyed by the governing elites.
Besides, they also lack adequate training in public
expression. Even in countries with a so-called long
democratic tradition, elites' discourse power, in most
cases, enjoys a dominant position.
The Internet has, to some extent, realized the
redistribution of discourse power, which mainly
manifests as opinion competition among multistakeholders. Traditionally, the games among all
parties concerned were generally overshadowed
by time lag and geographic separation, for which
outsiders and marginal stakeholders barely had
any idea awareness. The truth, “unity of talking”,
interpretation and solutions were mainly determined
by elites from the government, enterprises and
professional circles. There was an asymmetry in the
resources of information, knowledge, power and
expression between the elites and the public. It had
long been recognized that enriching “the market
of views” with different opinions and promoting

equal competitions among them were to the benefit
of discovering truths.[9] Even so, due to a lack of
technology, platforms and mechanisms, the concept
of opinion competition was not truly implemented
into the practice of public crisis management.
By contrast, the Internet now manages to break
through the barriers of time and space, unveiling
the curtain of power and bringing a diversity of
opinions, competitions and confrontations to the
“front stage”. Under such circumstances, heated
debates are staged in the public opinion field
between the elites and the public, between different
elite groups representing conflicting interests, and
among different communities and individuals in
society. “The Internet helps marginal groups, who
used to be excluded from the mainstream discourse
of the public sphere, develop their own consultation
platform and communications network and compete
with the dominant meaning and practice.”[10]
Discourse power redistribution and opinion
competition are not restricted in the public
discussion of virtual space. Technically, the Internet
has established a democratic principle of openness,
equality and sharing, and gradually formed a
democratic atmosphere and concept featuring
dialogue, coordination, “decentralization” and “antiauthority”. Nowadays, social media are increasingly
blurring the boundary between virtual space and
reality. The virtual space is no longer a simple
reflection and extension of the real world. Instead, it
is now “formatting” society in accordance with its
own philosophy, values and approaches. The Internet
has the amazing potential to transform the “equal
right of accessing knowledge” into an astonishing
power of acquiring all equal social rights.[11] This
is an empowerment process combining the virtual
space with reality, during which the public gradually
develops the capacity and acquires the opportunity
to resist the discourse power of the elites.
In the face of this new situation, crisis managers
119
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generally have two options. One is to retreat to the
old pattern of a “single authority”, trying to stop
the redistribution of discourse power, suppress the
competition among different opinions and block
criticisms. The other is to accept the change in, or
even the disintegration of the traditional information
transmission order and discourse power landscape
so as to timely, actively and publicly engage in the
opinion competition. The first option is in nature a
“suppressive strategy”, the advantage of which is to
promptly create “harmony” and a “unified public
opinion”, the disadvantage of which is to further
complicate the technical operation and risk a loss
of trust. The second option falls into the category
of “persuasive” strategy, the advantage of which
lies in its compliance with the development trend in
this age of diversity and its capacity of promoting
democracy and good governance, the disadvantage
of which is it is prone to get caught in an exhaustive
fight against chaotic public opinions and even to
move away from democracy. In developing countries
like China, neither the government authority nor
the public have fully adapted to the reforms of
discourse power redistribution, opinion competition
and social relations reconstruction. On the one hand,
the government authority is often swinging between
“suppression” and “persuasion”. On the other hand,
the public is far from being good at harnessing
technical democracy and discourse power, and can
easily fall into either an outrageous or ecstatic state
created by irrational expressions.

2.Crises of Trust and Legitimacy
“Suppression” inevitably comes with more
dissatisfaction and distrust. “Persuasion” is
challenged due to a lack of trust. In a society
governed by traditional order, the public have
at least a relatively stable and subjective trust in
the elites. The Internet-facilitated redistribution
120

of discourse power has shaped such a tendency:
The asymmetry of information and knowledge
between the elites and the public are in a process of
continuous disintegration; the expression resources,
opportunities and status tend to balance and the
curtain of traditional power gets increasingly fragile
and transparent. Such disintegration, balance and
transparency make what the elites have said and
done seem suspicious. Because of that, the public,
acquiring discourse power and the right to participate
in opinion competition, become even more skeptical
about the elites. According to the empirical research
conducted by He Zhou and Chen Xianhong, in times
of public crisis, the Internet provides the public with
even broader space for public debates and public
“access to the media”. On the other hand, in the
face of an official discourse, the public, however,
tend to exercise their “access to the media” in a
complicated mentality or attitude mixed with doubt,
disapproval, contradiction, indifference, etc.[12]
Because of this, many researchers argue that relevant
authority should take the initiative to promptly
publicize information and statements to acquire or
reclaim the discourse power.[13] In fact, government
authorities are getting more and more skilled at
taking persuasive measures and strategies, including
swiftly and spontaneously communicating the truth
to the public. Even so, they frequently encounter
such embarrassments as “misspeaking from the very
beginning” and “talking much, erring much,” and
their disclosed information subsequently becomes
a source to trigger a new round of criticisms. Even
third-party experts, scholars and opinion leaders
are often ridiculed by the netizens as “bricksperts”
(same pronunciation with “experts” in Mandarin)
and “50-cent Party” (a colloquial term for Internet
commentators believed to be hired to manipulate
public opinion to the benefit of the Chinese
government) and are therefore deprived of the
qualification and capacity of leading public opinion.
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From the ruling elites’ perspective, the redistribution
of discourse power brings about a competition of
diversified opinions and de-constructs the traditional
trust mechanism, thus triggering a crisis of trust. For
the public, the redistribution of discourse power, to
some extent, means a process of decentralization,
anti-establishment, diversification and even
fragmentation, for which it is necessary and also
possible to remain skeptical about everything.
In a normal society, trust is a seemingly abstract
prerequisite for interpersonal communication;
while in times of crisis, trust is “materialized”
into a substantial amount of social capital. As a
type of social capital, once it is over drafted, the
government authority's “persuasive” strategy in a
public crisis will fall into futile performance. In a
time of Internet-based activities, with ubiquitous
“onlookers”, any performance done by a “loosely”
organized institution or individual may be
considered ridiculous, ironic and self-defeating
and a persistent offense to public opinion and
kindness. Therefore, the government should strive
to maintain and increase the trust capital in public
crisis management, not the other way around. Yet,
it is a pity that when the “persuasive” strategy
doesn't work well, some government authorities
may rely even more on the old means of dodging,
lying and suppressing or other tough tools, which
may further impair people's trust. This is no doubt a
vicious circle, which may work for a while but will
eventually strain the public’s trust. In a repressive
society with diminishing trust, the Internet is
transformed from a hub of public values into a
sphere of emotional release and collective peep.[14]
Continued distrust, i.e. the deepening and
consolidation of a crisis of trust, will result in a
crisis of legitimacy. A crisis of legitimacy refers
to a fundamental challenge, threat or subversion
of relevant authority's core values and the existing
basis and legitimacy of power. In a modern context,

the legitimacy of governance and decision-making
is mainly from three sources. Firstly, is procedural
legitimacy based on fair and just rules and systems;
secondly, performance legitimacy based on
contribution, efficiency and achievements; thirdly,
value legitimacy based on morality and justice,
spirit and belief. The three sources of legitimacy are
interconnected and any hamper or damage to one
source may trigger a crisis of legitimacy. “There
is no such country that can base its legitimacy
solely on a single ideal model of the three sources;
procedural legitimacy, performance legitimacy and
value legitimacy. In reality, a country’s legitimacy
source is normally a combination of the three ideal
legitimacy sources.”[15]
The redistribution of discourse power not
only transforms traditional opinion expressing
mechanisms, but also gives rise to an in-depth
reform advocacy – building the mechanisms of
trust and legitimacy in the era of the Internet.
The Internet shapes new concepts and makes
it possible for multiple subjects to have equal
dialogues and participate in opinion competitions.
On the other hand, the public are equipped with
more and more discourse power. Under such
circumstances, the mechanism concerning the
generation and maintenance of trust and legitimacy
is undergoing a quiet reform. According to the
principle of procedure, any subject or decision not
publicly discussed can be suspicious. In a larger
sense, any legitimacy based on a “centralized”
discourse power is possible to be challenged.
Meanwhile, performance legitimacy must survive
the observation, discussion and examination in a
transparent environment. Value legitimacy is also
the outcome of multi-consultations, the diversitybased “identity” and the “greatest common divisor”
of entities in a differentiated society.
Technically, the Internet offers a practical
channel for the public to discuss and vote for all
121
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public issues. Such expression and engagement has
witnessed a rigid growth and reflected the citizens’
will that “never goes down”. This is particularly
true in the context of a public crisis. Once people’s
discourse power and sense of participation are
excluded or suppressed, the crisis itself is no longer
a matter of temporary loss or retreat; instead, it
will directly disqualify the legitimacy of power and
decision-making. This basically explains the reality
that in some crises, even if relevant authorities
remained impartial and objective and had sufficient
“persuasive” resources and strategies, the public
somehow still refused to let it go and, depending
on the situation, initiated outrageous or ecstatic
waves, “opposing for the sake of opposing”. Once
a public crisis evolves into a crisis of legitimacy,
relevant authority’s defense of the fact itself becomes
insignificant. Judging from some successful
cases over the past few years, the key to effective
management of public crises is to reconstruct
the legitimacy of power and decision-making,
and improve the credibility, persuasiveness and
social recognition of the government’s procedure,
performance and values.

3. From Expressers to Movers
Discourse power redistribution facilitates
the reconstruction of the mechanisms of opinion
expression, trust and legitimacy. Will such
reconstruction further generate or change the social
action mechanism in a public crisis? When the public
acquires certain discourse power and transforms
from silent “addresses” to onlookers and expressers,
they begin to question relevant authority’s credibility
and legitimacy. Will they further develop into active
movers during a public crisis? Has the Internet
enhanced the possibility of such transformation?
In the beginning of the 21st Century, there were
comprehensive debates concerning the Internet's
122

hidden value of boosting democracy and liberation in
academic circles. Those debates concluded that the
realization of the Internet's above mentioned values
was under a variety of restrictions. In 2001, Jason
Abbott studied the cases of China and Malaysia to
explore the role of the Internet in political changes
and reforms. He considered the Internet to be an
important medium and tool to promote freedom
of speech and social resistance, holding that
aspects like localization, regionalization, education
inequality, gender differences and revenue gaps
made it difficult for the public to form a community
of action.[16] What concerned Abbott was whether
the public, with different views, could communicate
with each other and manage themselves. He further
questioned the public’s cognition and attitude
towards cyberspace. For example, he wondered
whether the general public’s distrust in relevant
authority and their challenge to its legitimacy could
truly be transformed into social actions in the real
world.
The Internet revolution in the next decade, to
some extent, has answered Jason Abbott’s question.
Web 1.0 equips the public with unprecedented
discourse power; while Web 2.0 provides strong
idea support and great technical convenience for the
public to take action. Around 2010, social media,
dubbed the masterpieces of Web 2.0, witnessed an
explosive growth worldwide. That marked a new era
in global IT revolution, during which the core value
of the Internet shifts from the production of mass
information and the communication among social
members to the reconstruction of social relations
and the extension of social members. Social media
like Facebook, Twitter, Weibo and WeChat facilitate
mass production, instant transmission and extensive
sharing of information online to form a community
of information. Meanwhile, they can also establish
and reconstruct interpersonal interactions to form
a community of relations in a direct way and with
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convenience. Furthermore, they can stimulate
public participation and social actions under specific
conditions to form a community of actions. Social
media has increased the chances for the public to
“upgrade” from onlookers and expresser to movers.
Given that, the public crises in the Internet
context become even more complicated and
unpredictable. Public crises today, bearing the
inherent uncertainties and risks of all crises, are also
crises of discourse power, trust and legitimacy, and
are likely to trigger a mass protest or movement at
any time. In this sense, current public crises expand
the potential for social movements and collective
protests. To some extent, the public no longer belong
to the abstract category of “otherness” or the vague
group of “the masses”. Instead, they are gradually
growing into active participants in public discussions
and social actions. The Internet (including
social media) manages to create the resources,
opportunities and technical possibilities for people
with very different backgrounds to transform from
noisy expressers to participants of joint actions.
Social media can bridge the gap between

the virtual space and the real world, forming a
mobilization and organizational mechanism to
“share information, establish relations and initiate
actions”. This process consists of three stages. In the
first stage, the public initiates or shifts their focus to
certain crisis-related topics, sharing information and
exchanging views with each other. During this stage,
individuals with a shared view and attitude can spot
each other and form an information community.
In the second stage, attracted by a particular topic,
people gather together and utilize social media
to establish or reconstruct one-to-one, one-tomany and many-to-many interactions, transferring
cyberspace-based interpersonal contacts to the
real world. In this way, the barrier and adversarial
relationships between cyberspace and reality is
lifted; the virtual community has developed into a
real one; the community of information has evolved
into a community of relations. In the third stage,
if a crisis-related topic or event concerns the vital
interests and the well-being of the public, members
of social media-based communities will immediately
gather and transform themselves from expressers

share information, establish
relations and initiate actions
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to movers. During this stage, the public also forms
a variety of communities, which challenge the
legitimacy of official decisions and power operations
in multiple forms and approaches. In most cases,
there is barely any consensus or mutual promotion
among different communities. Nonetheless,
those communities somehow manage to enhance
the “negative energy” of decentralization, antiestablishment and fragmentation.
Second, social media can also bridge the gap
between verbal expression and action, establishing a
dual-transmission mechanism capable of “informing
people at all levels” and “sharing information among
peers”. Onlookers’ spontaneous action needs to
be based on a “common cognition”, or rather, the
direction and approach of that common cognition.
And such a common cognition needs to be realized
through that dual-transmission mechanism. In most
cases, traditional media can only “inform people
at all levels”. That is because no press, broadcaster
or TV has the mechanism or capacity of breaking
down the horizontal information barrier and
establishing a parallel network of relations. Social
media, on the other hand, integrates the vertical
and horizontal transmission processes into a whole,
creating significant technical convenience for
reaching a consensus and initiating a joint action
among the most extensive group of netizens in the
shortest possible time. This expands the space of
discourse and action in a civil society. The fact
that the same piece of information is shared by all
people can help to alleviate individuals’ feeling of
humbleness, anxiety and powerlessness. Under such
circumstances, the collective confidence, courage
and ideal can develop and expand, waiting to trigger
a joint action. “Overall, the Internet serves as a
positive channel for the public to constantly test
and explore the bottom-line and weakness of social
control.”[17]
Last, social media can create a large number of
124

opinion leaders who actively lead public opinions
and social actions. There was no shortage of
opinion leaders in a traditional society, where, due
to limited transmission resources, even a renowned
expert or scholar could not make his or her voice
heard anytime, anywhere. In the era of the Internet,
however, apart from “public opinion leaders” from
the elite group and “professional opinion leaders”
from specific social areas, there are also “grass-roots
opinion leaders” emerging from the masses. Their
participation in the dialogues between officials and
civilians, and between civilians and businessmen,
has changed the traditional official-civil and civilcommercial social structures. In major public
opinion-focused events like natural disasters, manmade disasters and mass disturbances, opinion
leaders take a nodal position in the network of
public opinions and social relations, and play the
crucial roles of information transfer stations, opinion
amplifiers, emotion renderers and social action
organizers. They “often act as sources of information
or organizers of public events, overwhelmingly
guiding public opinions and initiating activities.”[18]
During the netizens’ transformation from
onlookers and expressers to movers, social media
allows information sharing and public-opinion
mobilization while completing relationship
establishment. The integration of virtual space
with the real world is the very outcome of virtual
communication; “sharing information among
peers” also means a process for netizens to establish
horizontal social relations; and opinion leaders
play a key role in connecting online communities
with those in the real world. Once a public crisis
breaks out, information sharing and relationship
construction are always the preferred choices for
the public. The former shapes public opinions in
a crisis context, while the latter tends to facilitate
the building of a corresponding community to deal
with crisis-related issues. Therefore, the government
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authority needs to pay attention to public opinions
and at the same time echo and integrate into the
community and the relationship network behind
those opinions. Although some government
authorities try their best to guide public opinions in
times of crisis, they never truly integrate themselves
into the public's community on social media like
Weibo and WeChat in an equal, open and interactive
manner.

4. Dialogue and Reconstruction of
Social Identity
Overall, the Internet, by its unique and
powerful mechanism of information production
and relationship development, facilitates the
redistribution of discourse power and challenges
the established mechanisms of opinion expression,
trust and legitimacy previously dominated by the
elites. The new round of Internet revolution, i.e. the
popularization of social media, further blurs the
boundary between virtual space and the real world.
Consequently, information sharing and relationship
construction are simultaneously conducted both
online and offline. The online communities are
thus “upgraded” from onlookers and expressers
to active movers. From a macro perspective, such
a reform intensifies the fragility of a risk society;
from a micro perspective, it further complicates a
specific public crisis. These dilemmas contain the
real solutions. The redistribution of discourse power
itself means an irreversible major reform. During the
process of orderly information dissemination and
social relationship construction, a new era is coming
into being, which will witness the decline of elites’
discourse dominance and the rise of multi-party
negotiations and equal dialogue. With the Internet's
deep involvement, there are inevitable competitions
among a diversity of opinions, interests and values
in a public crisis. Meanwhile, relevant parties will

fight for discourse power and legitimacy. On the
one hand, such competitions may trigger fierce
social conflicts. On the other hand, they may also
boast potentials for negotiation, dialogue and social
identity reconstruction.
Starting a dialogue means respecting the
diversity of different opinions, getting used to the
competition for acceptance of the mainstream
view versus the counterview and the marginalized
view, becoming adept at developing one’s own
discourse power, credibility and legitimacy in
public discussions, and advocating rational and
constructive social actions. In short, dialogue serves
to reconstruct a community in the age of pluralism.
In the face of reform-triggered uncertainties, conflicts
and divisions, the ruling elites aim to echo and guide
the reform and strive to reconstruct a social identity
and restore solidarity via dialogue. Proposed by Beck
and Giddens, the solution to modernity crisis and the
risk society promotes dialogism and conventional
communicative rationality to reconstr uct a
community through dialogue. To cope with a risk
society, Beck’s basic assumption is to implement
“participatory democracy”. According to Beck, the
modern society should encourage and pave the way
for all stakeholders, including ordinary citizens to
participate in public decision making, and establish
a risk management network featuring two-way
communications and coordinated action to jointly
tackle risks and resolve crises.[19] Giddens proposes a
more detailed solution to dialogic democracy. Given
the risks and crises pervading in almost all domains
of modern society, from individual space and society
to nature, he believes that only collective forces can
possibly bring about real change; that dialogue is a
basic tool for identity and community construction;
and that dialogue is a strategy of interests to fight
against crises, generate profits and boost mutual
benefits and also a strategy of significance to seek
common grounds and share experience. According
125
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to Giddens, dialogue is the only substitute for
violence in a risk society.[20]
The advocacy of dialogue acknowledges the
rationality of opinion competition. Although it
is true that such a competition may give rise to
social disorder, from a strategic point of view it is
conducive to the solicitation of intelligent views, the
cultivation of social identity and the maintaining
of long-term stability. Therefore, the right attitude
towards a diversity of opinions is to encourage their
full and sensible competition in dialogues, instead of
restraining their diversity. It is wrong and unrealistic
to give up dialogue and try to return to the age of
“suppression”. In the context of the Internet, oneway instilling without dialogue, however, much
effort is made, can produce nothing but a monologue
amid all those noises. It cannot even expect to attract
the public’s attention, let alone gain discourse power.
A crisis manager should invest significant energy,
resources and intelligence into the construction of
a dialogue mechanism in this age of pluralism, turn
all those noises into rational dialogues, and abandon
the oversimplified and crude attitudes and practices
towards public opinions. A full and rational opinion
competition is the right approach to redistribute
discourse power and cultivate social identity and
good governance. Accordingly, the key to public
crisis management lies in the possibility of seeking
a dialogue based on a diversity of opinions. Such
a dialogue is supposed to reduce damage, create
compensation benefits, restore order and reconstruct
identity.
The crisis of trust is a common symptom in
modern society. Giddens believes only dialogue can
resolve this symptom. He advocates the cultivation
of a multi-layered and multi-dimensional mechanism
(i.e. a mechanism between individuals and the living
environment, organizations, communities and the
societies to which they belong, and between nations
and states) of dialogic democracy to reconstruct
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an active trust in human society.[21] Giddens
categorizes the “indispensable trusts” between two
parties as passive trust, and those persuasive trusts
spontaneously established by two parties as active
trust. Evidently, good relations between government
authority and civilians, between civilians and
businessmen, and between communities should be
based on an active trust. According to Giddens, only
by revitalizing social communications (dialogue in
particular) and popularizing dialogic democracy can
a society expect to establish an active trust and thus
alleviate modernity crises in the areas of politics,
economy and culture. Both in terms of concept
and technology, the Internet offers a real possibility
for Giddens’ theory to become reality. Today, in a
public crisis, there is no obvious technical barrier in
one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one and manyto-many dialogues. What really matters is whether
the manager values openness and equality and has
the courage and wisdom to build an active trust and
reconstruct a community.
Dialogue is also an important approach to
overcome the legitimacy crisis concerning the
exercise of power and decision making. The rise
of the Internet has resulted in the ever-diminishing
“durability” and “validity” of government authority's
trust capital and legitimacy in decision-making
and the exercise of power. The establishment and
consolidation of trust and legitimacy is no longer
a one-for-all sure thing as it once was in the age of
dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Dialogue
thus becomes a key to the reconstruction and
maintaining of legitimacy and a basic means to
deliver other solutions. Through dialogue, a diversity
of opinions, interests and values are compared,
discussed and integrated. The dialogue itself is a
process of acquiring and consolidating legitimacy
and expanding the scope of legitimacy. In a specific
public crisis, dialogue outperforms the arbitrary,
antagonistic and closed process of power exercising
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and decision making. Through this process,
different opinions are openly expressed, and
expressers transform from a desperate opposition
and nonchalant onlookers to power holders and
decision enablers. At the same time, dialogue
can boost orderly participation and coordinated
governance and improve the mechanism of interest
coordination in a public crisis. On the one hand, it
helps to improve the performance of public crisis
management; on the other hand, it also expands
the consensus space for different stakeholders.
From the perspective of mass communications,
consensus space is built on the “common divisor”
of the interlocutors’ values. Therefore, dialogue can
help improve the performance, value legitimacy and
process of public crisis management.
Within the legal framework, the protests and
social actions in a public crisis should be responded
to through dialogue. Yet, dialogue doesn’t promise a
solution to any specific problem or seek a unanimous
agreement among all parties concerned. Instead,
the value of a dialogue lies in its ability to transform
the stakeholders in a crisis into a fully interactive
and mutually trusted community. Internally, this
community can always maintain a basic consensus
space and a shared value, even when tensions and
conflicts among its stakeholders trigger a protest.
It is worth mentioning that dialogues in a public
crisis should be based on some rational principles.
According to Jürgen Habermas, in order to create
a sphere where “everybody can speak” and “there
is no obvious absurd logic added”, a number of
basic principles of communicative rationality have
to be established. He also argues that to ensure
communications validity, interlocutors should follow
the following rational principles: The intelligibility
of discourse expression, the truth of objective
cognition, the rightness of subjects’ relationships and
social norms, as well as the truthfulness of subjective
motives. These principles are unified in “inter-

subjectivity”, which means developing an open and
equal “subject-subject” relationship, rather than a
dominant one-way “subject-object” relationship.
In Habermas’ view, communicative rationality
requires dialogues among plural subjects based on
the principles of equality, mutual understanding,
solidarity, respect, inclusiveness and common
progress.[22]
The communicative rationality and intersubjectivity proposed by Habermas are arguably
in line with Giddens’ “Utopian Realism”. Both
acknowledge the existence of modernity crises
and advocate the reconstruction of modernity,
or rather, further reaching the full potential of
modernity. Giddens attaches equal importance to
Utopian ideals and a down-to-earth spirit to utilize
“Utopian Realism” based principles to overcome
the crises and uncertainties in a risk society.
From a “Utopian” perspective, communicative
rationality should facilitate value innovation and
transcendence, and promote community solidarity,
progress and prosperity. From a “realistic”
perspective, communicative rationality requires
information publication, equal consultation, sincere
communication and diversified integration while
avoiding dislocation, unordered expressions and
random discussions. In the era of the Internet,
communicative rationality should serve as a
fundamental civic literacy and rule of social
operation. Cultivating a dialogue concept, methods
and rationality is a long-term process. Without a
daily dialogue mechanism, sustainable information
sharing, benefit reciprocity and value identity,
community reconstruction in a public crisis is much
likely to deteriorate to empty talk. Therefore, to
tackle a crisis, more effort needs to be made in areas
beyond the crisis. Dialogue-facilitated reconstruction
of social identity is based on the premise that
a community capable of weathering crises is
maintained through persistent dialogues.
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